Our colleague, Źmicier Koroteyew, offers a comprehensive account of legality and legitimacy of 2008 parliamentary 'elections' in Belarus, one of the last standing totalitarian regimes in Europe.
'PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS' IN BELARUS: LEGITIMIZED FRAUD?
by Źmicier Koroteyew
BACKGROUND
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus, although dominated by former Communists, was slowly progressing towards democratization. The old national symbols were adopted as the state Flag and Emblem, and the Belarusian language was actively being brought back to public life. However, the economic crisis of the early 1990s created a perfect demand for political populism. Thus, an MP Aliaksandr Lukashenko gained more than 80% of the votes in the first presidential elections of 1994 thanks to his anti-corruption rhetoric and anti-elitist platform. After that, Lukashenko organized a non-violent coup d'état through illegitimate referenda where he appealed to the wide class of modernization-losers and rural and urban lower classes. Since then, the President has concentrated the dictatorial power in both politics and economy. Not a single 'election' in Belarus since 1996 was recognized by the international community as free or democratic.
BEFORE THE 'ELECTION'
Although the current role of the Belarusian legislature is somewhat close to the Soviet Supreme Soviet, i.e. to legitimize decisions by the executive, the 'Parliamentary election' of 2008 attracted great attention of European states.
The Russian aggression against Georgia showed everybody in Europe that XIX-century methods (as described by Condoleezza Rice) were not history yet. Moscow was back to its old and usual behavior of unpredictability and unreasonable ambitions. In such situation in many EU member states the cold-war fears were remembered again. This was especially relevant in post-soviet Central and Eastern Europe and Poland seemed to be one of the most frightened nations. Since Belarus is the only barrier between Russia and Poland, Warsaw became the most active to drag Belarus away from Russia. After the hostile Belarusian-Polish relations in times of the former conservative government in Warsaw, the current liberal administration was eager to go very far in its pragmatic approach. The Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski visited Belarus and became an active lobbyist of Belarusian westernization on the EU level. Such a dynamic change of Polish attitude even provoked accusations that Poland was ready to betray the oppressed Polish minority in Belarus.
Besides foreign policy situation, there has been an essential event in the internal Belarusian political life. Three ultimate political prisoners were released, among them a 2006 Presidential candidate Aliaksandr Kazulin, that had been sentenced to five and a half years in prison. The release of political prisoners was recognized by both USA and EU as a progress in democratization and fulfillment of one out of twelve EU conditions for Belarus.
The following 'elections' pushed the regime to make an impression of a political thaw. The President himself was actively playing and sending signals that he was finally ready to provide at least minimal conditions for competitive election campaign. The rumors were circulating in the independent media that some opposition candidates will get to the Parliament. In his interviews to the European press, President Lukashenko confirmed he was expecting the recognition of the new Parliament, and thus the legitimization of his regime by the EU.
What the EU expected was obviously not expecting a free election, which would be impossible, but at least some political concessions by the regime. Letting some opposition candidates win could have been the easiest solution for Lukashenko in order to create an illusion of democratization and thus satisfy the Europeans. This was the reason why Western sponsors pushed the Belarusian opposition not to boycott the 'elections'. Therefore, only a minor part of the political forces decided not to take part in the 'elections', while the rest decided to give it a chance, stimulated by the hope to be admitted to the Parliament. However, these expectations of the EU were unrealistic, and even such minor concession was impossible for the regime in Minsk.
'ELECTIONS'
From its very first moment, the 'election' campaign proved that everything would go the usual way and the results would be falsified. Belarusian authorities used their traditional instrument to raise the turnout – advance voting. This technical possibility, originally created for the voters unable cast their vote on election day, has been extensively misused in Belarus for falsifications of the electoral results. The Government used administrative pressure in order to coerce the categories of the voters that are in a way or another dependent on State, such as students, employees of state-run enterprises, etc.; students, for example, were threatened with expulsion from dormitories. According to the official statistics, 26% of the voters took part in advance voting. This figure might have however been underestimated in order not to shock by its artificiality.
Three days before the 'elections', the independent media received from confidential sources a list of approved MPs and made it public. After the official results were announced, it turned out that the list was almost identical to them. The suspicions that the President always approves a draft list of elected MPs beforehand, thus proved to be true.
Numerous violations of electoral procedures have been registered by both the OSCE and by local independent observers. However, the usual procedure of violations which is always carried through in the Belarusian 'elections', is well designed so to hide the falsification. The 'elections' in Belarus are a confirmation the old Stalin's pun: "Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the votes decide everything." Thus, the observers are only allowed to watch the counting from a distance from which it is impossible for human eyesight to detect written information.
The falsification itself, however, takes place in the local electoral commissions (usually functioning in school buildings) that are completely in the hands of the regime. The ballot box used in the campaign is not sealed on the bottom, making it possible to falsify the election with a – usual screwdriver. A police superintendent at one of the polling stations in Minsk has noticed and reported officially that a ballot box in his polling station was opened and the unregistered ballots were inserted during the lunch brake.
The 2008 'election' was striking for its extremely low turnout as reported by independent observers. Although the official turnout was 75.3%, the independent observers estimated it at much less than the required 50%.
AFTER THE 'ELECTIONS'
The official 'election' results created a dilemma for Europe. On the one hand, the 'elections' were clearly undemocratic. Belarus is situated in Europe and therefore it is not possible to accept certain things there, that would otherwise be possible for other regions of the world. Recognition of the electoral fraud would ruin the image of European diplomacy and would be considered a betrayal for the opposition in Belarus. On the other hand, there is a clear necessity to turn the regime in Minsk towards Europe. The visions of single European countries on the Belarusian problem differed. Generally, the neighboring countries, like Poland or the Baltic states, were more interested in cooperation with Belarus for obvious economic reasons, while West European states could afford being less flexible.
Doubts were mostly over with the resolution of the European Parliament, with 597 vs. 31 MEPs saying 'yes' to cooperation with Belarus. However, the resolution and the following European decisions were a compromise solution of the above-mentioned dilemma. The European Parliament recommended to lift visa sanctions against Belarusian state officials for a period of half a year, except for those suspected of connections with the 'death squad' or the electoral fraud. The visa sanctions for the President himself were omitted in the resolution. The Luxembourg meeting of the EU foreign ministers agreed to enforce the decision of the European Parliament and to exclude President Lukashenko from the sanction list. As a consequence, the Belarusian ruler now has a right to enter the EU; nevertheless, it is doubtful that any European country would want to invite 'Europe's last dictator.'
The initial dilemma for the EU decision makers was also relevant for the Belarusian opposition. There are now two clear positions on the further actions of opposition. The 2006 Presidential candidate Alaksandar Milinkievič, who is still more popular than the leaders of other opposition parties, is calling for negotiations between Lukashenko's Government and the EU. Dr. Milinkievič claims that there is no other choice; if the current regime does not turn to the West, he claims, Russia will eventually get total control over Belarus. Surprisingly, this position was also supported by the famous initiator of the Belarusian Popular Front in the late 1980s Zianon Paźniak, known for his anti-Russian positions, who now lives as a political refugee in the USA. The other part of the opposition is still insisting on inter-Belarusian dialogue, having in mind the round table discussions in Eastern European countries in the late 1980s.
The development of the situation in Belarus however largely depends on the good will of the Belarusian ruler. Nevertheless, the ultimate economic problems caused by increase of gas prices and huge rise of foreign debt do not allow playing games with Europe, because it will not give any effect in the nearest future. In addition, the constant and increasing economic pressure by Russia makes the decision makers operate just in a short run.
Źmicier Koroteyew has a B.A. in International Relations from Belarus National University (Minsk) and M.A. in Political Science from Central European University (Budapest). Currently is a Ph.D. candidate at Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw). Źmicier has several publications on foreign policy issues in Belarus and abroad. Mail to: dkorotey[at]staszic.adminpan.waw.pl